This paper has as main objective present and discuss Gottlob Frege critic to the attempt to define the concept of truth, especially, the attempt to define of truth as correspondence. The correspondence theories of truth sustain that truth can be defined in terms of correspondence between sentences, propositions or true thoughts and facts. However, in his posthumous writing Logic (1897) and, after, in The Thought (1918), Frege presents a severe critic to this kind of approach. He holds that truth is (...) a basic, simple and sui generis concept, which cannot be defined. My paper will be divided in three parts: in the first part, I will present the doctrine that sustains the correspondence theories of truth and his main theses. In the second part, I will expose the arguments used by Frege in his critic; and in the third, and lastly part, I will discuss the Fregean thesis of the indefinability of truth. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to discuss whether the so called supererogatory acts exist and, if they do, how can they be part of an ethical theory. A supererogatory act is considered as an action that is not obligatory, i.e. it may or may not be performed by an agent without that entailing a moral error. Heroic and holy deeds, traditionally, have been taken as examples of acts of this kind. My proposal is to defend the existence of (...) these acts, although that does not imply that they are central within an ethical theory. The practice of a supererogatory act does not change the ethical status of those who performs it, since the act is not characterized as a duty. Supererogatory acts would be peripheral with respect to an ethical theory. (shrink)